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ABSTRACT
Crowd markets have traditionally limited workers by not provid-
ing transparency information concerning which tasks pay fairly
or which requesters are unreliable. Researchers believe that a key
reason why crowd workers earn low wages is due to this lack of
transparency. As a result, tools have been developed to provide
more transparency within crowd markets to help workers. How-
ever, while most workers use these tools, they still earn less than
minimum wage. We argue that the missing element is guidance on
how to use transparency information. In this paper, we explore how
novice workers can improve their earnings by following the trans-
parency criteria of Super Turkers, i.e., crowd workers who earn
higher salaries on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). We believe
that Super Turkers have developed effective processes for using
transparency information. Therefore, by having novices follow a
Super Turker criteria (one that is simple and popular among Super
Turkers), we can help novices increase their wages. For this purpose,
we: (i) conducted a survey and data analysis to computationally
identify a simple yet common criteria that Super Turkers use for
handling transparency tools; (ii) deployed a two-week field experi-
ment with novices who followed this Super Turker criteria to find
better work on MTurk. Novices in our study viewed over 25,000
tasks by 1,394 requesters. We found that novices who utilized this
Super Turkers’ criteria earned better wages than other novices. Our
results highlight that tool development to support crowd workers
should be paired with educational opportunities that teach work-
ers how to effectively use the tools and their related metrics (e.g.,
transparency values). We finish with design recommendations for
empowering crowd workers to earn higher salaries.
1 INTRODUCTION
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is the most popular crowd mar-
ket [51]. It allows crowd workers (Turkers) to earn money from
micro jobs involving human-intelligence-tasks (HITs). Although
MTurk brings new jobs to the economy, most Turkers still struggle
to earn the U.S. minimum wage ($7.25) [4, 30]. This is problematic
considering that “earning good wages” is the primary motivator of
crowd workers [3, 4, 49]. Many believe that the lack of transparency
on MTurk is the root cause why Turkers are not being fairly com-
pensated [30]. Economists consider that a market is transparent
when all actors can access vast information about the market such
as the products, services, or capital assets [74]. Similarly, Silber-
man et al. discusses how the lack of transparency on gig markets
affects workers earnings: “A wide range of processes that shape
platform-based workers’ ability to find work and receive payment
for work completed are, on many platforms, opaque [58].” MTurk
has primarily focused on providing transparency information solely
to requesters by allowing them to access in-depth knowledge about
Turkers. However, MTurk has traditionally provided more limited
information to workers (e.g., Turkers previously could not profit
from knowledge about requesters’ previous hiring record or the
estimated hourly wage of the tasks on the market, although as of
July 2019, this has started to change1). This lack of transparency
for workers can lead them to invest significant time in a task but
receive anywhere from inadequate to no compensation.
To begin addressing the issue of transparency, scholars and prac-
titioners have developed web browser extensions [13, 39] or created
online forums2 to bring greater transparency to Turkers. These tools
and forums provide Turkers with otherwise unavailable informa-
tion about requesters, tasks, and expected payment. For instance,
TurkerView allows workers to obtain an overview of the expected
hourly wage they would receive if they worked for a particular
requester. However, while an ever increasing number of workers
are using these tools for transparency [44], only a fraction of Turk-
ers’ earnings are well above the minimum wage [30]. The problem
is that utilizing transparency tools to earn higher wages is not
straightforward. Each transparency tool displays several different
metrics. This poses the question, which metric should a Turker
use to ensure better wages? This complexity has likely led most
Turkers to employ transparency tools ineffectively [44, 66].
Despite the challenges associated with using transparency tools,
top earning crowd workers on MTurk, those that make above the
minimum wage, have emerged. These rare workers are commonly
referred to as “Super Turkers” because they earn “superior” wages.
They have earned this name despite market conditions such as
limited availability of tasks and a greater percentage of low-paying
tasks[4, 8, 30]. We argue that it is Super Turkers’ ability to use trans-
parency that brings them a unique advantage[7]. Our goal was to
uncover one of the ways in which Super Turkers used transparency,
and then guide novices to follow that same criteria.
For this purpose, we first questioned Super Turkers on how they
used specific transparency tools to decide which tasks to perform.
We then conducted a data analysis of their responses to computa-
tionally identify a Super Turker criteria that denoted one of the
ways in which Super Turkers decided to use transparency. We
rooted our data analysis on the “Analytic Hierarchy Process”, a well
established multi-criteria decision-making approach [24, 45, 77]. By
using the Analytic Hierarchy Process we identify in a hierarchical
form the level of importance that Super Turkers give to different
transparency metrics when deciding what tasks to perform. We
utilized a hierarchical process given that transparency information
is not always available and workers have limited time to decide
1https://blog.mturk.com/new-feature-for-the-mturk-marketplace-aaa0bd520e5b
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what tasks to perform (especially as time spent finding labor is time
where workers are not paid [28]). We argue that the hierarchy helps
workers to more rapidly identify what transparency metrics they
should analyze; and if any of those metrics are unavailable, they
have a plan of what else to rapidly inspect [10]. We also aimed for
this criteria to be simple and popular among Super Turkers. Sim-
plicity was important to make it easier for novices to follow [61].
Popularity was important to have a decision criteria that was rep-
resentative of Super Turkers (although it is possible and likely that
Super Turkers also have other more complex criteria for deciding
how to use transparency.)
Once we had an identified transparency criteria that Super Turk-
ers utilized to select work, we conducted a field experiment to in-
vestigate how the hourly wage of novices changed when following
such criteria. Notice that it is not simple to run a field experiment
that can track how workers actually increment their hourly wages.
MTurk does not provide any information about the hourly wage
of a particular task nor how much time it would take workers to
complete a given HIT. It is, therefore, not straightforward how
one might calculate the change in workers’ wages over time [30].
To overcome these challenges, we developed a plugin that logs
workers’ behavior, calculates how much time workers spend on
each task, and estimates each worker’s hourly wage per HIT3. The
plugin is inspired on prior research and related tools[9].
Equipped with our plugin and the Super Turker criteria, we ran
a two-week field experiment. We had real-world novices perform
over 25,000 tasks on MTurk by 1,394 requesters, with the experi-
mental group of workers following the Super Turker criteria, and
the control group not receiving any additional guidance. Our study
uncovered that having novices follow the Super Turker criteria
did empower them to increase their income. We finish with design
recommendations for tools and platforms to increase crowd work-
ers’ wages. We advocate for tools that bring transparency, and also
teach workers how to best make use of that transparency.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Work Environment on Crowd Markets
Crowdsourcing not only facilitates the generation of ground truth
for machine learning [17], but also enables novel crowd-powered
technology [6, 36]. Technology companies use crowdsourcing as
“ghost work”, which is unperceived by end users [28, 56]. However,
criticism surrounding crowd markets compares them to sweatshops
or ”markets for lemons”[15, 38, 71, 78]. Receiving wages that are
less than the U.S. hourly minimum wage, which is $7.25 USD, is one
of the most significant disadvantages for workers in crowd markets
[5, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 47, 48, 67]. Besides the negative factor
of low wages, requesters create tasks for workers to perform, but
are able to arbitrarily reject the submitted work once the labor has
been accomplished [28].
Additionally, crowd workers spend a significant amount of time
performing invisible and unpaid labor, e.g., acquiring tasks, learn-
ing how to perform assigned tasks, and resolving conflicts with the
platform or requesters when discrepancies concerning payment
3Since calculating hourly wage of Turkers has proven a difficult task for researchers
in the past, we have released the plugin to help other researchers:
https://research.hcilab.ml/superturker
occur [25, 29, 30, 68]. One of the main reasons for this is that crowd
markets have imposed transaction costs, which were traditionally
assumed by companies, onto workers [16, 28]. Transaction costs
are the expenses associated with managing the exchange of goods
or services. Researchers have coined this situation “algorithmic
cruelty” as the algorithms behind the crowd market are generat-
ing critical pain points for workers, such as having no recourse if
their account becomes unfairly blocked, if their completed work is
arbitrarily rejected, or if they are not fairly compensated.
To further complicate the situation, crowd markets do not pro-
vide the same information to workers than to requesters. Usually,
requesters are granted access to a large amount of information
concerning the events in the marketplace; while workers have a
much more limited perspective [39, 40]. For example, MTurk allows
requesters to view the previous performances and interactions that
workers have had on the platform [30]; while workers can only
discern very little about what requesters have done previously (e.g.,
amount of rejected work, amount of unfairly paid tasks, or whether
they are frauds[26, 39]).
A consequence of this limited information (coined a “lack of
transparency” by researchers) is that crowd workers struggle to find
fairly paid tasks or even be paid. Additionally, crowd workers lack
basic benefits, e.g., paid sick leave, time off, and health insurance
[28, 31]. Also, the work on crowdsourcing platforms typically does
not help workers to advance their career [47]. As crowd markets
continue to grow, they threaten the hard earned workers’ rights
attained through the labor movements [31]. Additionally, labor
market oversight is more difficult in a crowd market economy[46].
2.2 Tools for Crowd Market Transparency
To begin addressing the unfairness that crowd workers experience,
researchers have created tools that bring more transparency to the
crowd market (e.g., tools that help workers better comprehend in-
formation about requesters and the market in general.) In this paper
we refer to these tools as “transparency tools.” These approaches
believe that through transparency workers can learn how to avoid
unreliable requesters and earn better wages [57]. Researchers and
practitioners have developed different forums and browser exten-
sions to help workers measure the reputation of requesters (e.g.,
how they previously interacted with workers) [57]. Crowd workers
use Turkopticon [39] and TurkerView [13] to evaluate requesters
[44, 68]. Fig. 1 displays the interface used on the Mturk, Turkopti-
con, and TurkerView. Turkopticon is an opensource tool that allows
crowd workers to rate the requesters with 4 “attributes” in a 5 point
Likert-scale: generosity (“pay”), promptness (“fast”), communicativ-
ity (“comm”) and fairness (“fair”) [39]. Crowdworkers can also leave
text descriptions to illustrate each requester and how they interact
with workers, as well as the type of tasks they post on the platform.
TurkerView is another transparency tool that allows workers to
visualize requesters’ reputations and offers metrics that are similar
to Turkopticon. TurkerView does have some differences. First, it is
not opensource. The tool has focused on commercializing its intel-
ligent algorithms that predict how a requester will behave based
on her interactions with workers who are using Turkerview[13].
Turkerview also offers a metric that predicts the hourly wage that
a given requester is likely to pay (which is not exact per task but
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Figure 1:What a turker sees: (a) the HITs, (b) requester’s rep-
utation metrics on TurkerView, and (c) requester’s reputa-
tion metric on Turkopticon.
provides an overall picture of how that requester operates). Browser
extension tools and forums have increased transparency on MTurk.
However, despite the availability of such tools, novices still fail to
recognize which requester will pay fairly [30, 44]. (These labor con-
ditions might change in the future with the introduction of “One
Line Of Code” to automatically ensure fair wages[79]. But these
approaches depend on the requester and the platforms wanting to
be “fair”, which is not always the case[28]).
Together, this suggests that unguided transparency is not suf-
ficient to ensure higher wages. We argue that adopting a Super
Turker criteria in a Analytical Hierarchy Process approach offers
the necessary guidance to novices to utilize transparency tools to
earn higher wages. Our study aims to:
• identify a common and simple criteria that Super Turkers
employ for using transparency tools to find work
• guide novices to follow the identified criteria
• increase novices’ earning potential
3 UNCOVERING SUPER TURKER PRACTICES
Our goal was to identify a common set of criteria that Super Turkers
implemented when using transparency tools. Each Super Turker
might value many different criteria. However, understanding that
novices progress to experts through repetition[27, 62], we were
interested in identifying criteria that were simple and widely ac-
cepted, so that novices could easily apply the criteria to earn higher
wages. For this purpose, we created a survey that questioned Super
Turkers on their criteria for using transparency tools, and then
conducted a data analysis over the responses to identify a simple
yet popular criteria that novices could easily follow.
3.1 Survey: Method
The survey contained 18 required questions and took 3 to 5 minutes
to complete. Our survey was rooted in prior research [65] and
based on our research questions. Participants were paid $0.60 USD
according to a legal hourly wage of $7.25 USD. The survey was
only available to workers, deemed Super Turkers, i.e., workers who
had done over 10,000 HITs and who earned more than the U.S
minimum wage. Similar to [44, 65], our survey began by asking
Super Turkers demographic information and questions about their
MTurk work experiences. These questions asked crowd workers
about their weekly working hours and how long they had been on
MTurk. Next, we asked workers to create flowcharts by selecting
Figure 2: Frequency of how often Super Turkers checked re-
questers’ ratings on Turkopticon and TurkerView.
and sorting through a list of steps. They denoted the order in which
they used different transparency tools and themetrics they analyzed
from each tool. For validity purposes, we based the list on prior
work that has studied workers’ actions around HITs [66, 81] and the
metrics that transparency tools, e.g., Turkopticon or TurkerView,
share with workers [13, 39]. Participants could either select and
sort all steps on the list or select and sort the specific few steps
that were key to them. After this question, each Super Turker had a
flowchart denoting her process for using transparency tools to select
HITs. Next, we studied the importance that Super Turkers gave to
different transparency tools and their associated metrics. For each
type of transparency tool that Super Turkers stated that they used
in their flowchart, the survey asked them how they handled such
information. The questions included how often they checked the
information and how important the particular metrics associated
with the information were. We questioned Super Turkers about
the minimum acceptable scores they had for each metric. We used
5-point Likert scale questions to ask Super Turkers about how often
they checked the metric (frequency) and the importance they gave
to the metric when making decisions. The options in our Likert
scales questions were based on the anchors created by Vagias [76].
The minimum acceptable score questions were slider questions that
ranged between scores 1 and 5 or “not applicable.”
3.2 Survey: Findings
100 Super Turkers completed the survey. To avoid malicious or
distracted workers, we added two attention check questions into the
survey. This resulted in us keeping 68 responses for the analysis, the
other responses were excluded because of failed attention checks.
3.2.1 Understanding Super Turkers’ Key Transparency Metrics. 88%
of the Super Turkers that participated in our survey stated that
they used transparency tools. Fig. 2 presents an overview of how
frequently Super Turkers used each of these tools to access trans-
parency information about requesters. Super Turkers primarily
used both TurkerView and Turkopticon plugins to evaluate re-
questers, although TurkerView was used slightly more frequently
than Turkopticon. Next, we analyzed the type of metrics that Super
Turkers took into account when using these tools.
Fig. 3 presents an overview of how important each Turkopti-
con metric was for Super Turkers. The most important metrics
were TO_fair and TO_pay (Notice that we use the term “TO” to
distinguish Turkopticon metrics from TurkerView “TV ” metrics).
More than half of the respondents (78%) considered that the TO_fair
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Figure 3: Overview of the importance that Super Turkers
gave to different “Turkopticon” metrics about requesters:
fair was the most important, followed by pay.
Figure 4: The importance of each “TurkerView” reputation
attributes.Hourly pay and Fair are crucial when Super Turk-
ers select a HIT to work.
metric was either “5 - extremely important” or “4 - very important”
when selecting HITs. Meanwhile, 72% of the respondents deemed
the TO_pay metric as “5- extremely important” and “4 - very impor-
tant.” TO_fair describes whether the requester rejects or approves
the work in a fair way, and TO_pay metric represents how well
the requester pays. On Mturk, requesters can gratuitously reject
workers and can indiscriminately refuse payment upon completion
of the tasks. Thus, this metric measures how likely is an individual
requester to reject or accept work in reasonable (fair) manner.
After understanding how important these different transparency
metrics were to Super Turkers, we sought to understand the values
that Super Turkers expected or looked for in each metric. Recog-
nizing these thresholds can help novice workers to better utilize
the metrics and be more effective at finding fair HITs. Our results
indicated that Super Turkers had different expectations for each
metric. 92% of our Super Turkers who used Turkopticon expressed
that they had a basic requirement score for TO_fair (e.g., they only
considered HITs who had a TO_fair score above a certain thresh-
old), and 90% of the Super Turkers had a basic requirement score
for TO_pay. The average requirement score of TO_fair was 3.69
(SD=0.78) and of TO_pay was 3.2 (SD=0.9).
We conducted a similar analysis for TurkerView. Fig. 4 shows
that for Super Turkers, the most valuable transparency metric
on TurkerView was: TV_hourly_pay, followed closely by TV_fair,
TV_rejection_rate and TV_block_rate. (Note the use of “TV ” in this
case.) The TV_hourly_pay metric estimates the hourly wage in USD
that a requester will pay Turkers. This is based on previous workers’
experiences performing tasks. To calculate this metric, TurkerView
averages the hourly wage of each HIT posted by the requester and
the amount of time it took workers to finish the task. TV_fair is
a metric denoting whether workers believe that a requester pays
fairly for the assigned task. TV_rejection_rate and TV_block_rate
display the frequency that a particular requester rejects or blocks
workers. When rejected or blocked by a requester, workers not only
lose the remuneration for the completed work, but they also receive
a bad record on MTurk. This hurts workers future employment
opportunities. When analyzing the details of the metrics, we find
that Super Turkers, on average, only accept the tasks of requesters
whose TV_hourly_pay was over $8.29 USD/h (SD = 3.03).
However, we must also contend with the situation that Turk-
erView and Turkopticon do not hold information about all re-
questers on the platform. When this is the case, the primary metric
to measure whether a HIT is worth doing is the reward it offers
and the description of the task. From our survey, 82% of Super
Turkers had fundamental requirements on the metrics of the HIT
rewards (i.e., for them to do a HIT, the reward needed to be above
a certain threshold.) The minimum acceptable reward for a task
averaged $0.23 (SD = 0.23, median = 0.2). Note that Super Turkers
took into account the overall reward rather than the hourly wage,
because MTurk only provides information on rewards (how much
the requester will pay in total if the worker completes the HIT).
3.2.2 Computing Super Turker Transparency Criteria. Once we had
an overview of the type of transparency metrics that Super Turkers
considered, we wanted to identify the sequential order in which
they evaluated these metrics. It is possible that Super Turkers have
various sequences for how they use the available transparency
metrics. Our goal was to identify criteria that was common (i.e.,used
by many Super Turkers) and concise. Most important was a concise
set of criteria for novices to efficiently and effectively implement.
For this purpose, we took all the flowcharts that Super Turkers had
generated, converted the steps into a text sequence, and used the
longest common subsequence algorithm [43] to identify the criteria
that was common and shortest among the Super Turkers in our
study. The algorithm computed the following criteria:
• Work only with requesters whose:
– “hourly pay” on TurkerView is over $8.29 USD/h (averaged
from values that Super Turkers provided for this metric).
– If such transparency data is unavailable:
∗ work only with requesters whose “fair”score on Turkop-
ticon is over 3.69 (averaged).
– If such transparency data is unavailable:
∗ perform tasks with reward > $0.23 USD (averaged.)
Notice that the computed criteria defines a hierarchy of trans-
parency metrics. The hierarchy helps in this case because not all
transparency metrics are always available to workers, i.e., some
can be missing. The criteria offers a way to potentially find “good
work” even under labor market conditions of limited information.
3.2.3 Super Turkers’ Impressions of the Criteria. We also asked
Super Turkers for feedback on the computed criteria (see Fig 5). In
general, Super Turkers approved the criteria. They also approved
of doing HITs that paid slightly more than $0.23 cents when no
other information about the requester was available. Their logic,
in such a situation, was to accept a task that paid slightly higher
than the average HIT in order to start earning money rather than
waiting. For instance, one Super Turker mentioned:
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Figure 5: Super Turkers’ view on the computed criteria.Most
Super Turkers approved the criteria.
“Being somewhat informed about a requester and the quality of
work will help you make more money. Sometimes you just have to go
with it because otherwise you won’t make anything.” -Super Turker A
Super Turkers commented that accepting HITs that offered lower
than their preferred pay just to ensure income was at times neces-
sary, especially as the market might not offer anything better:
“I think it’s a good strategy, but sometimes you may have to do
work for requesters whose hourly pay is lower. Sometimes you have
to do what work is available.” -Super Turker B
The Super Turkers who found the criteria “poor” or “fair” were
primarily workers whose strategy focused on doing batch HITs.
They felt the criteria did not represent their process. This is expected
given that the algorithm focused on computing a criteria that was
most common; instead of something that was representative of all
Super Turkers. But the criteria we identified served the purpose of
being computationally appropriate in representing the majority.
“...Setting it at $0.23 may cause workers to miss out on an excellent,
one click batch that may be $0.05...” -Super Turker C
Given these positive results, we tested the criteria with novices
in the real world to see how it might help increase their wages.
4 NOVICES USE SUPER TURKER CRITERIA
The first study allowed us to compute a common and concise crite-
ria of how the average Super Turkers decided what transparency
metrics to consider. The criteria was algorithmically constructed
based on the input from Super Turkers.
After computing the Super Turker criteria, we conducted a two-
week field experiment on MTurk and investigated:
• Do novices following the Super Turker criteria perform in-
dividual tasks that pay more?
• Do control group novices, who utilize their own criteria,
discover upon the identical Super Turker criteria?
• Do novices following the Super Turker criteria increase their
hourly wage?
4.1 Field Experiment: Methods
Our field experiment followed a randomized control-group pretest-
test design that is characterized by being similar to a between
subjects study, but with the addition that measurements are taken
both before and after a treatment [18]. This setup facilitates better
understanding of the change generated from experiments. For this
purpose, we split our experiment into two stages: a six-day pretest
stage to understand novices’ behavior and wages before our inter-
vention, and a six-day test stage to understand novices’ behavior
and wages after our intervention (i.e., after telling novices to follow
the criteria). We divided the subjects into two groups:
(1) Control group. During the entire study (i.e., throughout
the pretest and test stages), novice crowd workers used trans-
parency tools and completed tasks as normal;
(2) Experimental group. In the pretest, novice crowd workers
used transparency tools and completed tasks as normal; but,
in the test stage, they were instructed to follow the decision-
making criteria of Super Turkers.
We recruited 100 novice Turkers. Similar to prior work, we con-
sidered novices were workers who had completed less than 500
HITs [12, 75]. The completion of 500 HITs is also within the proba-
tion period of MTurk [1, 63] We randomized novices across each
of our two conditions (50 workers in each groups). All novices in
our study reported using Turkopticon and TurkerView (which is
aligned with the findings of previous work that identified that most
workers are using transparency tools [44]).
Pretest Stage. In this stage, participants across conditions were
asked to: (1) install a Google Chrome plugin we developed; (2)
performHITs as normal. The plugin allowed us to track participants’
behavior (types of tasks they did, requesters they worked with, and
earnings made.) We used this information to study how workers’
wages changed over time and track how they utilized transparency
tools. Participants were allowed to uninstall our plugin at any time,
and we rewarded them for the period of time that they had our
plugin installed on their computer. We paid novices $0.60 USD for
installing our extension, accounting for the US federal minimum
wage ($7.25/hour) as installation took less than 4 minutes.
Test Stage. In this stage, novices in the control group were
asked to continue working using their customary method; while
in the experimental group, novices were asked to make decisions
using the identified Super Turker criteria. Participants were also
informed that the criteria came from Super Turkers and could
help them to increase their hourly wages. For this purpose, at the
beginning of the test stage, we emailed participants and informed
them of the activity they would do with us that week. Similar
to prior work that has run field experiments on MTurk, we paid
participants in the experimental group another $0.5 for reading the
criteria and an additional bonus of $0.10 each time they followed
the criteria to select a HIT and completed it. On average, we paid
participants a total of $4.90 for following the criteria; the participant
who received the most for following the criteria earned $24.70.
Similar to [20], only participants in the experimental group were
paid extra to follow the criteria. In both the control and experiment
group, we continued paying participants each day they kept our
plugin installed. To avoid our remuneration interfering with our
study, we paid these bonuses at the end of our experiment and
did not include our HIT remuneration when calculating workers’
hourly wages.
4.1.1 Collecting and Quantifying Workers’ Behavior. For our study,
we needed methods for: (1) collecting and quantifying workers’
behaviors and the HITs they performed; (2) flagging when workers
utilized the Super Turker criteria; (3) measuring howmuch workers’
hourly wages changed when following the criteria. We created a
Google Chrome extension3 (i.e. plugin) to collect crowd workers’
behavior onMturk. The plugin tracked the metadata about the HITs
that workers previewed or accepted, and the timestamps of when
workers accepted, submitted or returned HITs (i.e., tasks which
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Figure 6: We separate work series based on time intervals:
When the time interval is less than B, we consider the tasks
are all within the same work series. If not, we separate them
into different work series.
were accepted but for various reasons not completed). In specific,
the plugin collected:
• HIT information, such as title, rewards, timestamps (accept/
submit/ return), requester IDs, HIT Group IDs, and HIT IDs.
• Worker information, such as daily earnings on the dashboard,
installed extensions, approval rate, and worker IDs.
• Requester reputation information, such as ratings on Turkop-
ticon and TurkerView.
There were certain things our plugin did not record: the required
specific qualifications for a HIT and the HITs that participants
decided to not take (preview or accept). To maintain workers’ pri-
vacy, our browser extension also did not record workers’ browsing
records outside of MTurk or workers’ personal data (such as worker
ID, qualifications, among other personal metrics).
4.1.2 Identifying Whether Workers Follow The Criteria. Once we
had collected and quantified the completed tasks of novices, our
goal was to identify the novices who had followed the Super Turker
criteria. To accomplish this, we took the transparency data available
for each task that novices completed (i.e., TurkerView’s expected
hourly wage, Turkopticon’s fairness score, the HIT reward) and
used the flowchart presented in section 3.2.2 to determine whether
the HIT followed the criteria. We name HITs that meet the estab-
lished criteria as Super HITs. After this step, each novice had a
list of Super HITs and non-Super HITs associated with them. We
considered that novices with over 70% of their HITs labeled as Su-
per HITs to be workers who followed the Super Turker criteria.
For our study, the threshold of 70% was selected based on prior
research that has established this amount as an adequate threshold
to measure whether people are following new behavioral patterns
[23, 55]. After this step, we had a list of novices in our experimental
group who had followed (or not) the criteria.
4.1.3 Measuring Workers’ Hourly Wages. After compiling the list
of novices who followed the criteria and those who did not, our
goal was to calculate each novice’s hourly wage and determine
whether the workers following the criteria increased their wages.
To calculate the hourly wages of a worker we need to measure: (a)
the income that a worker earned; and (b) the amount of time they
worked to earn that income.
A. Total Earnings. A worker’s earnings does not come solely
from HIT compensation (i.e., the salary that MTurk states they
will pay when HITs are completed). Workers might also earn HIT
bonuses, i.e., additional rewards from requesters whose amount is
usually unknown before performing the HIT. To record both re-
ward and bonuses adequately, we logged the “Daily Income” from
workers’ dashboard which already considers both values directly.
Using the values specified in workers’ dashboard helps us to con-
sider circumstances where workers’ labor might have been rejected,
i.e., no payment for completing a HIT. However, there are some
issues with tracking workers’ wages using the dashboard: not all
requesters pay workers as soon as they submit their work. In these
cases, the payment can be delayed for several days. To overcome
this problem, we checked workers’ dashboard three days after the
end of the whole experiment to give requesters time to make their
corresponding payments. For all participants in our study we cal-
culated their daily wages (IncomeD ) through this method for the
twelve days they participated in our study. Using this method, we
were able to calculate workers’ total earnings.
B. Total Working Time. To calculate how much time a worker
required to complete a task and earn specific wages, our exten-
sion logged: Timestart: the exact moment when a worker accepts
a HIT; and Timeend: the moment when a worker returns or sub-
mits a HIT. Notice that workers might take breaks [59] and spend
time searching for HITs, calculating the working time as simply
Timeend − Timestart is not appropriate. To overcome this problem,
we adopt an approach similar to [30], where we consider that a
worker is doing series of tasks continuously if their time interval
is less than B minutes (as shown in Figure 6.I) and consider they
have started a new series of tasks if the time interval is larger than
B minutes (as shown in Figure 6.II). When calculating the hourly
wage, we set the between time (B) between the task series as 12
minutes because in normal industries employees must be paid for
any break [59]. The tasks done within the same work series S share
the same time interval TimeS,d , where d represents the date when
that particular work series began. We measure the time interval for
series S as follows:
TimeS,d = max
s ∈S {Timeend,s,d } −mins ∈S {Timestart,s,d }. (1)
Aworker’s total number ofwork hours in dayD, (WorkinдHourD ),
is the sum of the working time of all the series they did on day D:
WorkinдHourD = Σd ∈DTimeS,d (2)
For a given workerw , her overall hourly wage for day D is:
wD =
IncomeD
WorkinдHourD
. (3)
After this step, we had the hourly wages earned for all novices;
and for novices in the experimental group, we labeled them accord-
ing to whether or not they followed the criteria.
4.2 Field Experiment: Findings
Our experiment ran for 12 days during late October 2018. A total
of 100 unique novice workers participated in our study and were
randomized across our two conditions. Participants visited (i.e.,
previewed or accepted) a total of 25,899 HITs during the two week
process. The recorded HITs belonged to 2,568 unique HIT groups
posted by 1,394 unique requesters. Novices visited 261 HITs on
average, and visited 102 HITs in the median.
4.2.1 Novices, Super Turker Criteria, And Hourly Wages of HITs.
In the previous section, we established a common and concise
criteria constructed from surveying Super Turkers. However, it
was unclear whether following the criteria would guide novices to
perform individual HITs that actually paid them more per hour.
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Part of the criteria was to select tasks that TurkerView predicted
would likely earn workers a particular hourly wage. However, it
was yet unclear whether TurkerView offered available information
on these individual HITs. To better understand the ecosystem in
which our novices operated and contextualize the availability of
transparency information, we analyzed the details of all the HITs
novices completed. In our field experiment, our participants worked
for 1,394 different requesters. Although, our statistics demonstrated
that only 772 of these requesters had been reviewed on both Turk-
erView and Turkopticon, 500 requesters were not reviewed on
TurkerView, 430 requesters were not on Turkopticon, and 318 re-
questers had not been reviewed on either TurkerView or Turkop-
ticon. These results demonstrated that for 36% of the requesters
for whom novices worked with, there was no information about
them on transparency tools. For requesters whose transparency
information was missing, the Super Turker criteria recommends
analyzing the reward of the HIT, i.e., the default metric on MTurk,
and only performing HITs that paid more than $0.23.
Additionally, even when TurkerView’s expected hourly wage
was available, it is calculated for average workers (i.e., TurkerView
considers the average time it takes all workers to complete tasks
for a particular requester and based on this calculates the expected
hourly wage given what that requester typically pays.) However, it
is unclear whether this average length of time would also pertain
to novices. It could potentially take novices more time to complete
certain tasks, and hence they would earn less.
In order to investigate whether novices following the Super
Turker criteria performed tasks that actually paid them more per
hour, we took all the HITs that novices completed and calculated
the real hourly wage that novices received for the HITs. This was
based on how much time it took them to perform the task, and the
actual amount of money they received for finishing the task. Next,
we identified the tasks that were Super HITs and those that were
not, and we compared the hourly wage between these two groups.
We first focused on inspecting the HITs that lacked transparency
information. Across conditions, novices in our study accepted and
submitted 9,503 HITs. Of these, there were 979 HITs from requesters
who lacked data on Turkopticon and TurkerView. From this group
there were 232 Super HITs (i.e., HITS that rewarded more than
$0.23) and 747 HITs that rewarded less than $0.23 (non Super Hits).
We conducted a Mann-Whitney U test to compare the real hourly
pay between these two groups given that the sample sizes of these
two kinds of HITswere different and they presented a large standard
deviation. The Mann-Whitney U test showed that there was a sig-
nificant difference in the median hourly wage between Super HITs
and non-Super HITs when workers can only access the information
about the rewards (U=68667, p<0.0001). The median hourly wage
that Super HITs paid was $3.97, while non-Super HITs paid $2.76.
Thus, following the SuperTurker criteria can guide novices in their
decision-making to identify individual HITs that pay them higher
hourly wages, even when transparency data about the requesters
posting the HITs is missing.
Next, we compared the real hourly wages of Super HITs and
non-Super HITs that had available transparency data. Figure 7
showcases the hourly wage that workers earned for Super HITs
(N=4,047, 42.6% of the submitted tasks) and for the HITs that did not
Figure 7: Distribution of the hourly wage of all HITs that
novices selected that had transparency data available. Super
HITs tended to provide a higher hourly wage.
follow the criteria (N=5,456, 57.4% of the submitted tasks). We elim-
inated the outliers and computed a t-test to compare the difference
between these two groups. The t-test showed that there was a sig-
nificant difference in the actual hourly wage that workers received
for completing Super HITs and non-Super HITs (t(5806)=11.151,
p < 0.0001). This highlights, that novices who follow the Super
Turker criteria are able to distinguish which individual HITs, when
performed, will pay them higher wages per hour.
4.2.2 SEARCHING TIME AND THE SUPER TURKER CRITERIA.
Our previous analysis uncovered that individual Super HITs had a
higher hourly wage than non-Super HITs. In general, the median
hourly wage of all Super HITs was $7.04/h , while the median
hourly wage of all non-Super HITs was $3.27. Note this hourly
wage only considers the time that workers spent in completing a
task, not the uncompensated time that workers need to expend to
search for HITs. Crowd markets have placed these costs, that were
traditionally absorbed by companies, onto workers [28]. Such costs
include the time that workers spend searching for work. In a micro
job atmosphere, these costs to workers pose a serious issue.
In this analysis, we were interested in studying whether the
quest for Super HITs could possibly lead novices to spend a greater
amount of time searching for work, hence reducing their hourly
wages (considering that the hourly wage involves the time workers
spend searching for work in addition to the time completing work.)
In this setting, we considered that the searching time includes
searching for HITs in the HIT pool, previewing HITs, and accepting
HITs but not yet submitting them. We identified that novices for a
given task spent a mean and median searching time of 168 seconds
(SD=388) and 20 seconds, respectively. Additionally, the searching
time for Super HITs and normal HITs was different. The median
searching time for normal HITs was 9 seconds, while the median
searching time for Super HITs was 61 seconds. Next we calculated
novices’ total working time as time spent searching for work plus
time spent completing tasks. Through our analysis, we identified
that the median hourly wage for Super HITs, when considering
searching and working time together, was $4.12/h; while for non-
Super HITs this wage was $2.13/h. Therefore, it appeared that while
there was an overhead cost imposed upon workers for searching
for Super HITs (i.e. avoiding non-Super HITs), the overhead cost
was worth it for increasing the hourly wage.
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Figure 8: Box plot comparing the hourly wage of novices in
both groups. The solid line denotes the median value and
the dashed line denotes the mean value. Novices following
the Super Turker criteria increased their wages more.
4.2.3 Novices Discovering The Super Turker Criteria Independently.
Next, we examinedwhether novices had already adopted the decision-
making criteria of the Super Turkers before instructing them to
follow it. If this were the case, it might be unnecessary to teach
novices how to effectively use transparency tools to decide which
tasks might pay more. For this purpose, we analyzed the meta-data
of all the HITs that novices decided to perform in the pretest stage
(i.e., we studied the HITs novices accepted and submitted). From
this, we inspected the number of HITs that were Super HITs. We
identified that a minority of novice workers in our study (25%) were
already unwittingly utilizing the Super Turker criteria.
4.2.4 The Super Turker Criteria And Novices’ Hourly Wages. In this
analysis, we focused on comparing the actual hourly wages that
were received by novices following the Super Turker criteria com-
pared to what control group novices received. However, 32 control
group participants and 19 from the experimental group uninstalled
our plugin before the test stage started. This was likely due to the
lengthy nature of our study. For the remaining 49 participants, we
identified that 7 control group participants were already using the
Super Turker criteria from the beginning (i.e., during pretest stage),
and 12 of the participants in the experimental group never followed
the identified criteria. Given that we were interested in studying
the change of wages that occurred after utilizing the Super Turker
criteria, we discarded the above participants’ data. In the end, 21
experimental group participants and 11 control group participants
were remaining for our analysis.
From these participants, we studied howmuch their hourly wage
changed between the pretest and test stages. For all novices, we
calculated the change of their hourly wage as the median hourly
wage they received in the test stage minus their median hourly
wage in the pretest stage. Fig 8 presents an overview of how much
the hourly wage of novices changed in both the control and the
experimental group. During the pretest stage: the control group
had a median hourly wage of $1.55 and mean of $3.00; while the
experimental group had a median hourly wage of $2.16 and mean of
$1.95. In the test stage, the median and mean hourly wage that con-
trol group novices earned reduced to $1.19 and $1.17 respectively.
Meanwhile, the median and mean hourly wage of novices in the
experiment group increased slightly to $1.93 and $2.20 respectively.
We computed a Mann-Whitney U test to examine whether the
difference in observed wages between the control and experimental
groups was significant. We used the Mann-Whitney U test given
that both the control and experimental groups were independent,
had different variances, and presented small sample sizes. More-
over, The Mann-Whitney U test does not compare mean scores
but median scores of two samples. Thus, it is much more robust
against outliers and heavy tail distributions. The Mann-Whitney U
test showed that there were significant differences in how much
the median hourly wages of novices varied between the control
and experimental groups (U = 48,p = 0.006).
Next, we investigated whether the change in wages that each
condition presented between pretest and test stages was signif-
icant. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test highlighted that the change
in wages in the experiment group was not significantly different
(Z=115, p=1.00). However, the change in wages that the control
group presented was significantly different (Z=61, p=0.04). This
finding might hint that the general pool of HITs during the test
stage had worse remuneration than the pretest; hence, this explains
why we witnessed a decrease in control group wages since there
was no intervention. To better understand this ecosystem, we exam-
ined the hourly wages of all HITs in the pretest and test stages. In
general, the mean and median hourly pay of all HITs in the pretest
stage was $11.68/h (SD=44.92) and $4.73/h. The mean and median
hourly wage in the test stage was $14.877 (SD=92.66) and $4.59/h.
Between stages, there was no significant difference in how much
HITs paid novices per hour (U=5,280,800, p=0.34).
Given that the hourly wage of the HITs appeared to be in general
the same in the pretest and test stages, it remained unclear why the
control group had decreased their wages so drastically in the test
stage. We decided to investigate further. We studied the amount of
time workers spent searching for work in the pretest and the test
stages. A change in searching time could denote that workers might
have experienced a harder time finding tasks to perform, even if
there was no change in the rewards that they received for the tasks.
In general, workers could have seen a drop in their earnings simply
due to not enough available tasks for that week. For this purpose,
we calculated for each stage the average time that all workers spent
searching for tasks. We discovered that there was a significant
difference between the amount of time that workers spent searching
for HITs in pretest vs the test stages (U = 4, 109, 600,p < 0.001).
Participants spent 158 seconds on average (median=16, SD=379)
to find a HIT in the pretest stage; and 262 seconds (median=64,
SD=436) to find a HIT in the test stage. This increment could be
attributed to the fact that identifying Super HITs is more time
consuming than searching for normal HITs.
To understand more deeply what was taking place, we compared
the difference in searching time for the Super HITs and non-Super
HITs. In the pretest stage, the median searching time for Super HITs
was 46 seconds; while it took 9 seconds for non-Super HITs. In the
test stage, the median searching time that the control group took to
identify Super HITs was 131 seconds; while it took 121 seconds for
non-Super HITs. Note that we analyzed all HITs in the pretest stage;
however, we only analyzed the control group HITs in the test stage.
This was done to avoid the influence of our intervention (i.e., the
experimental group in the test stages cannot represent the regular
searching time due to the fact that we informed them to search
according to the criteria). We identified that the searching time for
both Super HITs and non-Super HITs increased from pretest stage
to test stage. This result suggests that, in general, MTurk likely
had fewer HITs available for novices in the test stage. This was
Becoming the Super Turker:
Increasing Wages via a Strategy from High Earning Workers , ,
why, on average, the novices searching time increased. However,
despite this adversity, novices following the Super Turker criteria
maintained their wage level, while the wages in the control group
decreased significantly.
5 DISCUSSION
Our experiments demonstrate the potential of using the criteria of
Super Turkers to guide novices on how to use transparency tools to
find work on MTurk. The majority of novices following the Super
Turker criteria increased their wages, even while novices in the
control condition decreased their salaries (likely due to the limited
tasks available that week on MTurk.) Our study provides insights
into the impact these highly effective workers can have on novices,
as well as demonstrating the feasibility of connecting transparency
tools with educational opportunities to increase workers’ wages.
In this section we discuss our results, highlighting especially the
challenges and opportunities we envision in the research area.
Super Turker Criteria. Our study uncovered one of the most
common and concise set of criteria that Super Turkers adopted
to handle transparency to find fair work. It was computationally
derived from surveys of Super Turkers and helped novices decide
which MTurk tasks to perform by utilizing transparency tools as
a means to earn higher wages. Our model was based on previous
studies that demonstrated how “shepherding” novices could help
them to improve their labor [21].
An interesting observation on the particular Super Turker crite-
ria that we uncovered, is that it considered the circumstance that
when the hourly wage metric was missing, it was best to look at
Turkopticon’s fairness value instead of inspecting other metrics
related to how well the requester paid. Fairness on Turkopticon
regards whether the requester will reject or accept a worker’s la-
bor. Crowd markets have traditionally contained power imbalances
where workers have limited power in comparison with requesters
and platform owners [28]. Part of the imbalances arise because
most crowd markets are very concentrated: almost 99% of all tasks
are posted by 10% of the requesters, who do not have to negotiate
with workers about whether or not they will accept or reject their
labor. If workers and their work are rejected by a requester, workers
generally suffer from a lack of accountability in response to their
complaints or attempts at restitution from requesters and platform
owners. This can translate into wasted time, loss of a paycheck,
and little opportunity to raise awareness about possible exploita-
tion [72]. According to Pew research, 30% of all gig workers have
experienced non-payment at least once [28]. The US Freelancer
Union reports a much larger number, where allegedly 70% of cur-
rent freelancers have at least one client who has not paid them
[33]. This could explain why the criteria recommended inspecting
Turkopticon’s fairness score. This step in the criteria, in particular,
attempted to ascertain which situations needed to be avoided by
Turkers in order to prevent non-payment or rejected labor.
The Super Turker criteria we identified considered that if the
Turkopticon fairness score and the TurkerView hourly wage were
missing, the best course of action was to look directly at the HIT’s
reward. One reason for this strategic behavior by Super Turkers is
that for every minute they spend analyzing a HIT’s transparency
metrics, they are losing out on the chance to earn money (ultimately
reducing their hourly wages). Notice also that lower reward HITs
could still provide high hourly wages, especially because the dis-
tribution of the hourly wage is a near normal distribution given a
specific reward amount [30]. In this setting, Super Turkers might
be betting that HITs that are paying more than $0.23 will likely
provide higher hourly wages. Moreover, following this behavior
will likely reduce the unpaid time spent searching for labor.
Field Experiment. While transparency is now available to Turk-
ers via different plugins, workers still receive less than theminimum
wage [30, 73]. We believe that part of the problem is that workers
likely cannot interpret or evaluate the value of their work and its
relationship with the transparent information they are now observ-
ing. Several workers might also not necessarily have the analytical
skills to interpret all of the transparency metrics that tools, like
Turker View, provide [41]. Our aim with this research was to iden-
tify a practical way to use transparency in MTurk and study if that
could help crowd workers to increase their salaries. Our field exper-
iment highlighted that guiding novices in their decision-making
by following the Super Turker criteria lead them to earn wages
that were higher than what they would earn working on their own.
Our results emphasize that transparency is required but it is not
sufficient. Utilizing transparency skillfully can transform salaries
on MTurk. Our method helped novices to earn more. We identified
that the difference in hourly wage between the control group and
the experimental group was significant.
Observing the decrease in wages of the control group during the
test stage, we recognize that workers’ salaries are dependent on
task availability. Thus, we suspect the hourly wage decline may be
attributed to the fluctuation of the task pool. The composition of
the tasks available to workers was different each day during the
time period we ran our experiment. The fact that tasks are different
from day to day in crowd work is documented [44]. MTurk does not
guarantee that there are enough well-paid tasks every day and this
issue poses a difficulty for crowd workers[4]. Through our analysis
we identified that novices in the control group spent a greater
amount of time searching for HITs during the test stage. The time
spent searching for work is time where workers are not paid. Hence,
novices in the control condition saw their hourly wages reduced as
they spend more unpaid time searching for work. However, even
during a phase where there might have been limited high paying
tasks, our experimental group was able to increase their wages.
As we think in practice about how to deploy these strategies at
scale [50], it can be important to consider how enforcing strategies
that make use of commercial tools, such as Turker View, could
potentially create further social divisions on MTurk [80] (especially,
as only workers who could afford to pay for such tools could follow
the strategy). Moving forward, we plan to explore strategies with
only opensource platforms and that are aware of workers’ privacy
and autonomy concerns[28, 42, 54].
Difficulties in promoting the Super Turker Criteria. Our field
experiment also helped us to identify first hand the difficulties in
getting novices to follow the decision-making criteria from Super
Turkers (even though following the criteria had the added incentive
of potentially higher wages). Half of the novices in our experimental
group did not follow the instructions from Super Turkers. One of
the reasons for this might be that novices simply did not have the
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qualifications to perform the HITs that satisfied the criteria that
Super Turkers recommended. Therefore, even if they wanted to
follow the criteria they might not have been able to access and do
the related HITs. In order to protect workers’ privacy, our plugin
did not track worker qualifications or the qualifications that tasks
imposed on workers, we believe there is likely value in exploring
interfaces that help crowd workers gain the qualifications they need
to access higher paying jobs [44]. However, it is interesting to note
that 75% of the Super Turkers in our study lacked master Turker
qualifications. It is unclear which type of qualifications novices
should strive for in order to successfully perform higher paying
tasks. Future work could explore how qualifications affect the type
of labor and wages novices can access.
Another reason why workers might not have followed the Su-
per Turker criteria is that we posted and shared the criteria as
requesters. Workers might have viewed the Super Turker instruc-
tions as part of the task they were doing for us and not as something
that was meant to really support them. As a result, their motivation
for following the criteria might have been lacking. Previous educa-
tion research has shown that students who use reciprocal teaching
strategies (i.e., strategies where students share with each other ad-
vice) tend to have better performance than students working on
their own or even students who are working directly with a profes-
sor [70]. Similarly, recent crowdsourcing research has highlighted
that increasing the interactions between workers can help novices
to more easily develop their skills and grow [12, 19, 75]. In future
work, we will examine different interfaces for sharing Super Turker
criteria with workers to increase the adoption of the criteria.
Design Implications and FutureWork. Weobserved that novices
could improve their wages by imitating how experienced workers
used transparency tools. We believe there is value for researchers
and practitioners to build systems that teach novices the trans-
parent information that is pertinent to achieving their goals. The
objectives of these systems are not only to recommend to novices
the tasks they should perform, but also to help them understand
and learn what kind of tasks pay fairly (potentially extrapolating
such knowledge to other crowd markets and online spaces). We also
believe there is value in creating on-the-job tutorials that can guide
workers on the type of labor they should perform. Designing such
tutorials is time-consuming but crucial for empowering workers,
who often have limited time and resources, to earn higher wages.
Future work could explore designing data driven tutorials that are
generated in part based on the patterns of effective workers. There
might also be value in exploring educational material that has been
generated for audiences with time constraints [22].
Additionally, to build more trust and participation on crowd
markets, it might also be worth to explore transparent interfaces
that can inform the different actor of a marketplace just how much
each actor is being fair and respectful of others’ values [11]. Fu-
ture work could explore other ways of recruiting Super Turkers
and eliciting information from them, e.g., via video recordings or
interviews[60]. Such studies could explore how using different
mechanisms for eliciting information relates to the type of infor-
mation that is obtained from Super Turkers. Related, it might be
interesting to specifically investigate other types of Super Turker
criteria that might exist. For instance, investigate how Super Turk-
ers use transparency tools when multitasking[80]. Future work
could also explore what happens in other crowd platforms (e.g.,
Uber, Upwork, or Citizen Science platforms) when novices adopt
the strategies from high earning participants or the strategies from
accounts who are contributing the most [2, 14, 52, 64, 69].
Limitations.We conducted a real world experiment which is
not simple given the limited availability of HITs and lack of in-
formation provided by MTurk about workers’ hourly wages [30].
The issue of limited and inconsistent HIT availability has been
documented in other research and we experienced, firsthand, the
possible implications this has on workers’ wages and on conducting
“clean” research [4]. Notice also that we recruited Super Turkers
who were willing to engage in surveys on MTurk (missing those
who do not do surveys). Additionally, our algorithm focused on
computing a criteria that was commonly used and simple to im-
plement. Therefore, our criteria did not represent all Super Turker
behavior. For instance, some Super Turkers might only do HIT
batches that pay $0.01 cent and can be completed in less than 10
seconds, resulting in an hourly wage of approximately $36/hour.
Nonetheless, given that our goal was to identify one of the strate-
gies that Super Turkers adopted, and study how it plays out when
used by novices, we considered our approach to be computationally
appropriate and representative. Notice that our study focused on
breadth instead of depth to start to shed needed light on how Super
Turkers use transparency and how this plays out when adopted by
novices. Future work could conduct longitudinal studies inspecting
the amount of time it takes novices to adopt on their own some
of the Super Turker strategies vs guiding them to adopt the strate-
gies from the start. Having task interruptions and multitasking are
dependent on people’s work style and preferences [53, 80]. Future
work could explore how strategies with multitasking differ from
strategies with only monotasking.
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